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Dealing with Bribery/Corruption in a Host country 
     
 
 
Abstract:   Multinational business managers and companies with an ethical bent of mind find 
it difficult to navigate bribery/corruption in a host country which has systemic or large scale 
corruption and often end up debating such decisions. This paper proposes the ‘stakeholder 
compliance approach’ as a decision-making guideline to assist the managerial decision-
making process in such situations.  
 
Keywords:  Bribery, Corruption, Stakeholder, Managerial Decision-making  
 
Corruption literature and the works of various international anti-corruption agencies such as 
Transparency International document numerous instances of bribery involving public officials 
and multinational companies. Despite two significant international anti-corruption 
legislations1 and four other regional ones2, the incidence of bribery in international business 
has not decreased but on the contrary has increased as indicated by the Bribe Payers Indices3 
of 2002 and 2006.  Bribes are sought by public officials as a quid pro quo for their 
discretionary powers and as a rent for their services, also termed in literature as ‘rent seeking 
behaviour’ on part of public officials (Bhagwati, 1982; Bardhan, 1997). Likewise bribes may 
be offered to buy the discretionary powers of a public official by gain seeking business 
managers as extensively discussed in Roy (2008). Some managers and companies accept and 
even take part in bribery as a matter of commercial prudence or economic necessity while 
others refuse for a number of reasons. Yet others face an ethical dilemma in their decision-
making, especially in an international context. In such cases usually a debate ensues as to 
whether home country morals and standards are to be applied or host country morals and 
standards are to be adopted in their business conduct. This debate between application of 
home or host country morals and standards is found in the works of De George (1990); Bowie 
(1999) and Donaldson & Dunfee, (1999). Authors such as Bowie (1999:19-25) take a stand 
that all business actions including bribery/corruption should be viewed in terms of Kantian 
deontology while some others strongly argue that corruption should be evaluated in terms of 
‘consequentialism’ (Jonson, 1997: 172-177).  
 
Irrespective of the arguments, utilitarian or deontological, there is no denying that 
multinational business policy and operational decisions made while dealing with corrupt 
                                                 
1 The OECD Anti-bribery Convention, 1999 and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
2003 
2 OAS Anti-Corruption Convention, 1996; Council of Europe (Criminal) Convention, 1998; Council of 
Europe (Civil) Convention, 1999; African Union Convention on Combating Corruption , 2003 in its 
nascent stages 
3 Bribe Payers Indices (also known as BPI) show the propensity to bribe on part of companies from 
exporting/ trading nations. The latest BPI is available at www.transparency.org   
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demands and/or bribery in a host country can have a profound impact on commercial as well 
as stakeholder issues such as sustainable development and human rights4. The cases of Shell 
(as explored in Wheeler et. al., 2002) and Enron USA (as in McClean & Elkind, 2003) reveal 
how operational decisions when tainted with corruption can have serious repercussions for the 
company and its stakeholders. Shell was accused of complicity in human rights violations in 
Nigeria while Enron faced allegations of corruption, bribery in India and Brazil.  
 
This paper aims to propose the ‘most appropriate’ way for multinational companies in dealing 
with bribery/corruption with an underlying assumption that the subject company is ethically 
predisposed and stakeholder conscious or is oscillating in its decision-making but the 
company is willing to consider an ethical way out of a corruption-related situation. In 
addition, this paper limits its scope to “grand corruption” (as defined in Elliot,1997) and 
excludes all situations of facilitating payments (small payments demanded by lower level 
officials also termed as “petty corruption in Elliot, 1997) which most multinational companies 
are forced to pay in certain parts of the world in course of doing business.   
 
The first section of the paper briefly examines the impact of bribery/corruption in business 
and society on stakeholders followed by a discussion of two multinational business 
approaches noticed in practice, in dealing with corruption/bribery in a host country. Section 
two explains one of these approaches, namely the ‘when in Rome approach’ to dealing with 
bribery/corruption while section three critically looks at the ‘legal compliance approach’ to 
dealing with corruption and its shortcomings vis-à-vis stakeholder issues such as human 
rights. The final section of the paper proposes a third approach for multinational business 
managers in dealing with corruption and bribery. It extends the legal compliance approach to 
include protection of stakeholder interests consciously. The paper proposes that the third 
approach to dealing with corruption and bribery in a host country is more appropriate than 
confining one’s actions to the moral minimum of compliance with law or a surrender to 




                                                 
4 Human rights as enshrined in the United National Universal Declaration of Human Rights and can 
involve situations of using child labour, unfair employment practices, denying or taking away means of 
one’s livelihood such as land being acquired without adequate and proper compensation. This is only 
indicative and not exhaustive.  
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I. Bribery/Corruption:  Stakeholder Impact   
The prevalence of corruption and bribery in every ancient civilization, be it Babylonian, 
Egyptian, Judaean, Indian, Chinese, Roman and Greek, is discussed at length in the work of 
Alatas (1990), amongst other notable ones. Human society has never been without the 
presence of corruption and bribery.  Today, corruption and bribery are not confined to any 
geographical boundary or any single nation or a particular culture, but occur universally on a 
daily basis. Transparency International, an international NGO fighting corruption, records 
daily media reports of corruption/bribery from all over the world.5 Not a single working day 
passes without instances of corruption/bribery being reported as having occurred in some part 
of the globe. That brings us to the next question as to how serious is the impact of Corruption 
and Bribery on society if it is happening on a daily basis?  
 
Empirical studies by World Bank economists such as Mauro (1997) provide tentative 
evidence about the economic effects (i.e. lowers growth and investment) of corruption. Mauro 
(1998) has also provided the first cross-country (across sovereign nations) empirical evidence 
that corruption affects the composition of government expenditure and adversely impacts 
government expenditure on education. Gupta, Demello & Sharan (2001) suggest in their 
study that nations with higher incidence of corruption also experience higher military 
expenditure in relation to both a nation’s GDP and government spending. Leite & Weidmann 
(2002), in their empirical studies of natural resource rich nations, who are otherwise poor, 
found that such nations experience slow economic growth due to the incidence of rent-
seeking activities of public officials and corruption. Gupta, Davoodi & Tiongson (2002) 
concluded in their empirical study that nations with high levels of corruption experience 
adverse consequences on infant mortality rates, higher percentage of low birth weight babies 
and higher dropout rates in primary schools (the authors used Corruption Perception Indices6 
of each country selected for the study and then used individual country data against the above 
three variables to support their findings). Tanzi (1998:45) explains the qualitative effects of 
corruption on the economy, namely: distortion of markets, distortion of allocation of 
resources, distortion of incentives, corruption as an arbitrary tax, increase in poverty, 
reduction of the legitimacy of a free market mechanism and distortion of the fundamental role 
of government.  
 
                                                 
5 Accessible at www.transparency.org 
6 Corruption Perception Indices are annual indices released by Transparency International. They 
convey the level of corruption in a country as perceived by its people (business leaders, press, 
academics, accountants are usually surveyed)  
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Nevertheless, responses to corruption-related situations differ amongst managers and 
companies. Some may reject bribery/corruption outright while others may consider 
bribery/corruption as a matter of commercial necessity and adopt one of the two approaches 
noticed in practice and mentioned in literature. They are the ‘when in Rome approach’ and 
the ‘legal compliance approach’. But both these approaches do not usually take into account 
the impact of one’s corrupt acts on stakeholder interests (such as issues of sustainable 
development and/or human rights). 
 
II. The ‘when in Rome approach’:   
In a host country situation, a popular response to corruption in business is to adopt the ‘when 
in Rome approach’. Its meaning and essence originates from the saying “when in Rome, do as 
the Romans”. This approach has been defined in the work of Fadiman (1991). Usually when 
one adopts the ‘when in Rome approach’, multinational business managers justify their 
bribery as being dictated by local business conditions and a host country system that is 
corrupt. The argument advanced is that others pay a bribe or involve in acts of corruption, 
hence if the company does it then it is a suitable response to the host country business 
environment and if the company does not bribe then the company will not be able to do 
business in that country. Figure 1 depicts the ‘when in Rome approach’.  
 






Multinational business managers in such situations like to believe that their decisions were 
objectively made in the greater interest of the company and more so because other companies 
are doing it and the business environment in the host country is such. But, this cannot be 
logically treated as objective because a decision-making manager cannot separate himself or 
herself from the usual object of observation (economic goals). The decision-maker in a 
corruption-related situation is placed in a situation of “position-dependent objectivity” or 
“positional objectivity” Sen (2002:463-483).  According to Sen (2002:465) the notion of 
positional objectivity, “is important in understanding the objectivity of beliefs, whether or not 
these beliefs happen to be correct.” He goes on to explain, “what we can observe depends on 
our position vis-à-vis the objects of observation.” The observer (decision-making manager) 
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The presence of positional objectivity in a corruption-related situation is apparent from the 
memoirs of Carl Kotchian, director of Lockheed. Kotchian, in his personal memoir, Lockheed 
Sales Mission: Seventy Days in Tokyo (Jacoby et.al, 1977:163) wrote:  
                Was it really possible, from the standpoint of reality, to say, “I refuse to pay”? 
                I thought of all the effort expended by the thousands of men since the conception 
                and designing of the L-1011 Tristar; our superhuman efforts to avoid bankruptcy 
                because of our own financial difficulties as well as similar difficulties of the engine 
                maker (Rolls Royce); the successive defeats in both the KSSU and Atlas compet- 
                -itions in the Eurpoean theater.  I thought of the painful final efforts of the seventy 
                days. And I thought of being told: If you make this payment, you can surely get 
                the order of as many as 21 airplanes.” I must admit that my moral and ethical 
                considerations gave way to the commercial gains we had been seeking for so many 
                hard days and weeks. 
Kotchian’s question: “Was it really possible, from the standpoint of reality, to say, “I refuse to 
pay?” offers a position-dependent insight into the mind of a decision-making manager. 
Kotchian concludes that there is no other solution but to pay a bribe for securing the much 
needed business deal.  The discussion here is not to find fault with either party to the bribe 
transaction, but to achieve a deeper understanding of the ‘when in Rome approach’. It is 
possible that after Lockheed’s bribery was exposed, Carl Kotchian may have written his 
memoirs as a public relations device or he may have written it in genuine remorse and 
reflection. Whatever the purpose, if we search for answers in any such situation of corruption 
and bribery in a host country situation, then we are likely to face the proverbial question of 
whether the chicken came first or the egg. Someone wanted to pay a bribe so someone took it 
or it could be someone asked for a bribe so somebody paid it. Irrespective of Kotchian’s 
argument, his ‘when in Rome’ approach did not save him or Lockheed from US Senate 
investigations and the consequences Lockheed faced thereafter. Thus, adopting a ‘when in 
Rome approach’ in corruption-related situations cannot absolve the participant company or its 
employees participating in a corrupt transaction from legal and ethical obligations towards a 
company’s stakeholders by merely saying that business conditions dictated the act of 
bribery/corruption.  
 
III:  The ‘Legal compliance approach’:   
The ‘legal compliance approach’ considers compliance with the law as a response to demands 
for bribes or corrupt situations in a host country. In case of US companies, it also includes 
compliance with home country laws i.e. the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1977 that 















But since 1999, compliance with law for a multinational company is not restricted to 
compliance with host country or home country laws alone but it also calls for an 
understanding of the international and regional anti-bribery and anti-corruption conventions 
that may become applicable to a multinational company. A brief discussion of two prominent 
international anti-corruption legislations relevant to the ‘legal compliance approach’ for 
companies:  
 
The OECD Convention 7 
The OECD Convention for Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials came into effect 
on February 15, 1999. The 17 article Convention “criminalises active bribery of foreign 
public officials” and lays down guidelines for 34 signatory nations to adopt and implement 
the Convention within their national legal infrastructure. These signatory nations control 70% 
of exports and 90% of foreign direct investment worldwide (Pieth, 1999). The objective of the 
OECD Convention is to reduce or eliminate bribery in international business conduct. The 
purpose is to achieve good governance, economic development and fair competitive 
conditions in international business. The preamble to the convention document states: 
          Bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international business 
          including trade and investment, which raises serious moral and political  
          concerns, undermines good governance and economic development,  
         and distorts international competitive conditions. 
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The preamble has identified “good governance and economic development” as issues to be 
protected by the convention. The seventeen article OECD Convention criminalises active 
bribery of foreign public officials and uses words such as “offer”, “attempt” and “conspiracy” 
in the first article of the convention to define the offence of active bribery but the Convention 
and its articles fail to cover passive bribery, private to private corruption8, compensation for 
parties affected by corruption, responsibility of state for corrupt behaviour of public officials, 
whistleblower protection, funding of political parties.  
 
 However, the OECD Convention, 1999 has been not been able to eliminate/reduce the 
incidence of corruption and bribery in international business as is evident from the results of 
the Bribe Payer’s Indices 2002 and 2006 published by Transparency International. The results 
indicate that propensity towards overseas bribery has not gone down after the Convention 
came in force. The indices also indicate that companies from OECD signatory countries such 
as USA, Japan, France, Spain, Germany, Singapore and United Kingdom are involved in 
paying bribes. Peter Eigen, Chairman of Transparency International has gone on record 
saying that, “large numbers of multinational corporations from the richest nations are 
pursuing a criminal course to win contracts in leading emerging market economies of the 
world.”9 In a survey conducted by Transparency International, it was revealed that only 19% 
of the 835 respondents were aware of the OECD Convention criminalising bribery, implying 
that 81% of these business experts were not even aware of its existence10.  
 
However in situations where a multinational company and its managers are aware of the 
OECD Convention and intend to comply with the requirements of the OECD Convention it 
would be sufficient for a company to follow a decision-process as under without reflecting on 
stakeholder issues 








                                                 
8 Private-to-private corruption has been defined in UNCAP, 2003 and refers to corruption within the 
private sector. 
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Hence, if a company were involved in any other form of bribery, other than active bribery, 
then they would arguably have complied with the minimum requirements of the OECD 
Convention. Such a company can also escape prosecution in a maze of laws pertaining to 
jurisdiction and rules of evidence in most countries who are not signatories of the OECD 
Convention. As is evident from the above, such compliance if used will still leave a scope for 
stakeholder dissatisfaction and unethical behaviour in situations of ‘private-to-private 
corruption’ or in situations of “passive bribery” (Roy, 2008).  
 
The UN Convention against Corruption, 2003 (UNCAP)11 
This is the most significant anti-corruption convention by far, with the largest number of 
signatory nations and participant nations. The Convention has been signed by 111 nations and 
is open for signing to all nations and regional economic organizations.  In its preamble the 
Convention acknowledges that corruption is a threat to democracy, stability and security of 
societies, ethical values and justice. It recognizes the link between ‘corruption and organized 
crime’ and declares corruption as a global issue that requires a multi-disciplinary approach 
with international co-operation to prevent and control it.  The 71 article Convention provides 
an exhaustive coverage by far, of issues relevant to the public sector and public officials 
ranging from relevant definitions, jurisdictional issues, preventive anti-corruption policies and 
practices (article 5), preventive anti-corruption bodies (article 6), public sector (article 7), 
Code of Conduct for Public officials (article 8), public procurement and management of 
public finances (article 9), public reporting (article 10) to abuse of functions (article 19), illicit 
enrichment (article 20), laundering of proceeds of crime (article 23), obstruction of justice 
(article 25), freezing, seizure and confiscation (article 31), protection of witnesses, experts, 
victims (article 32), whistleblower protection (article 33), co-operation between nations 
(article 38), between law enforcement agencies (article 37), international co-operation (article 
43), extradition (article 44), joint investigations (article 49), assets recovery process ( article 
51, 52, 53, 54,55, 56) .  
 
From the perspective of the private sector, this Convention provides an exhaustive coverage 
of provisions covering accounting, financial issues and governance issues (article 12), 
denying tax deductibility for bribes paid  (article 12), bribery of national public officials 
(article 15), bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international 
organizations (article 16), trading in influence (article 18), bribery within the private sector 
                                                 
11 www.un.org  
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(article 21), embezzlement of property in the private sector (article 22), liability of legal 
persons and natural persons in charge of the legal persons (article 26).  
 
Like all previous anti-corruption conventions (regional and international), this one too fails to 
explicitly mention the link between corruption (both in business and in public life) and 
stakeholder issues such as human rights, although the preamble does make a passing 
reference to the issue of sustainable development. Articles 34 and 35 deal with the 
consequences of corruption (without any mention of the issue of human rights or sustainable 
development) and provides for compensation to victims of corruption. This seems to imply 
that human rights abuse victims can institute damage recovery proceedings against erring 
companies and company executives. The recent out of court settlement whereby Shell paid a 
sum of $15.5 million to the victims of human rights abuse from Nigeria is a vindication in this 
direction12.  
 
The Relevance of anti-corruption Conventions to business decision-making:  
These anti-corruption conventions and their exhaustive coverage of corruption-related issues 
are testimony to the incidence of corruption and bribery and the far-reaching consequences of 
corruption. These conventions have provided frameworks to signatory nations to amend and 
adapt their local laws to these conventions. But, the prerogative to amend laws and bring them 
in tune with the conventions rests with the nation in question and many nations are still 
bogged down by the failings of their own legal system. Extradition agreements and 
jurisdictional issues need to be streamlined before the articles in these conventions acquire 
some teeth. Moreover, neither of these two conventions recognizes the incidence of 
facilitating payments of small amounts, a reality of everyday life in many countries around 
the world. Therefore, from the perspective of a multinational business manager dealing with a 
corruption-related situation, there is still plenty of scope for a manager or a company to 
escape accountability in the maze of current anomalies in law, asymmetric enforceability and 
jurisdictional issues.   
 
Protecting Stakeholders: The Stakeholder Compliance Approach  
 
The third approach proposed in this paper is based on the stakeholder concept and compliance 
with stakeholder interests as a more appropriate commitment of business to society. The term 
‘stakeholder’ has gained prominence in management literature during the last 25 years, 
especially through the works of scholars such as Freeman & Reed (1983) Freeman (1984); 
                                                 
12 www.guardian.co.uk /world/2009/jun/08/nigeria-usa/ accessed on 26 June 2009 
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Donaldson & Preston (1995); Phillips (1997); Freeman (2008) to name a few prominent ones.  
The concept can be defined, both, in a narrow sense or a wide sense depending on which 
perspective one adopts. Freeman & Reed (1983) have defined a stakeholder as any 
identifiable group/individual who can affect the achievement of an organisation’s objectives 
or who is affected by the achievement of an organisation’s objectives. In a narrow sense, the 
same authors have defined a stakeholder as any identifiable group/individual on which the 
organisation is dependent for its continued survival. In other words, a stakeholder can be an 
unknown group or an individual who is either affected by the actions of the company or 
whose actions can affect the company. Therefore, if a company took part in an act of bribery 
or corruption, there is a possibility that as a consequence a group of people or an individual 
could be affected by that, and in turn if that group of people/individual take action against the 
company as a result then it can harm/ hamper the company’s objectives.   
 
Dealing with bribery/corruption using the ‘when in Rome approach’ or the ‘legal compliance 
approach’ does not rule out certain situations that can affect stakeholders or in turn attract 
stakeholder protests and actions against the company. Moreover, there can also be situations 
where a company has complied with the law and not done anything illegal, but has set in 
motion acts that harm/ affect stakeholders. For instance, a company can legitimately donate to 
election campaigns, lobby politicians, provide some permissible gifts or facilities (example: 
scholarships to children of public officials from company-funded charitable trusts) to public 
officials with an expectation of some reciprocal benefit for the company. Such reciprocal 
benefits may range from securing legal sanction for the company’s business operations that 
could harm the environment (example: lax pollution control laws); permit business practices 
that are complicit13 in the violation of human rights (example: ignoring the use of child labour 
by contractors); business decisions that could affect communities and sections of society 
(such as the decision to set up a manufacturing activity on existing farmland on which a local 
community is dependent without exploring other possibilities but instead using government 
support and legislation to evict farmers from their land). In the aforesaid situations, 
companies could be complying with the law and yet could use their power and wealth to 
subtly ‘buy’ action in their favour from the government, and these government sanctions 
within a legal framework could still have an impact on people, while companies pursue their 
economic objectives.      
 
Multinational business managers usually consider the achievement of economic goals as the 
most important aspect of their presence in a host country while the current law and existing 
                                                 
13  For a more detailed understanding of what amounts to being “Complicit in Human rights violations” 
please refer to the UN Global Compact and related websites at www.un.org.  
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anti-corruption conventions are considered as parameters within which one can operate. That 
in turn also implies that whatever the law has not expressly prohibited or has seemingly 
permitted may indeed be harmful to stakeholder interests i.e. inter-alia issues of sustainable 
development, protection of the environment, human rights issues. The managerial focus on 
economic objectives alone in corruption-related situations was evident in a survey of 41 
multinational business managers at Mumbai, India. The surveyed multinational business 
managers dealt with corruption/bribery in a host country (India) with a focus on the economic 
goals of business and not on the stakeholder impact of their actions (Roy, 2005).  
 
In addition, when managers follow the narrow path of the legal compliance approach without 
thinking about stakeholder issues, there is also a risk that ethical boundaries will be pushed, 
especially in countries where the laws are still inadequate in terms of covering various 
situations and exceptions. This situation was observed in the case of Enron’s dealings in India 
and Brazil. In the same case, Sims (2002:174) observed that the culture at Enron “ate away at 
the company’s ethical boundaries, allowing more and more questionable behaviour to slip 
through the cracks.”    
 
Conduct of business should not lead to outcomes of human suffering, degradation of the 
environment, loss of means of livelihood or any such outcome that will mean a legacy of pain 
and regret for us and our future generations. Although sustained profit outcomes are essential 
for the continued survival of business, its very existence is also dependent on the continued 
goodwill and acceptance of business operations by society. Business cannot and does not 
operate in an isolated sphere, but within society. If society rejects the actions of business, 
sooner or later business will find it difficult to sustain profitability and survive (example: the 
demise of Enron). Thus dealing with corruption and bribery in a host country is not only a 
matter of legal compliance, but also an exercise to be alert about stakeholder issues that can 
be affected by any corrupt acts on part of the decision-making multinational business 
manager.  Figure 4 depicts the proposed ‘stakeholder compliance approach’ in dealing with 
corruption/ bribery in a host country or even in one’s home country. The law is a moral 
minimum and usually moves at a pace slower than all the ingenuous ways of corruption, 
bribery and fraud that surface from time to time as ‘scandals’ in our newspapers and media. 
New laws and amendments made to existing laws, whether nationally or internationally, are a 
matter of hindsight not foresight as these scandals provide a learning curve experience 
(example: The Sarbannes Oxley Act passed in USA after the fall of Enron, World.Com., 
Parmalat and a few others). 
 
 12
A stakeholder approach to dealing with corruption/bribery widens the frame of reference from 
pursuit of ‘economic objectives’ to pursuit of ‘economic and social responsibility objectives’. 
A narrow view would be to consider these objectives as incompatible for business managers, 
but a strategic view would be to consider satisfaction of both objectives as inter-dependent 
and self-enriching. Freeman (2008) has convincingly argued in favour of companies 
managing for stakeholders. He has advanced four arguments in support, namely: The 
‘argument from consequences’ which recognizes the joint interests of business and society in 
surviving and thriving; the ‘argument from rights’ where one recognizes stakeholders have 
rights and if this is not recognized then we could attract consequences; the ‘argument from 
character’ which argues to make ethics integral to the way one thinks and acts in business 
with the objective of avoiding bad faith and ultimately self-deception (example: The Enron 
Scandal) and lastly, an argument as a ‘pragmatist’ weaving a common thread with the 
previous three arguments recognizing that business is a platform for “concern with freedom, 
equality, consequences decency, shared purpose, and paying attention to all the effects of how 
we create value for each other” (Freeman 2008:86).  
     
 What is then called for is an internal motivation on part of multinational business managers 
to add their own conscience to the statute and honour stakeholder obligations such as human 
rights, protection of the environment and issues of sustainable development as their 
contribution to society as managers and custodians of societal wealth.  This process is 
depicted in Figure 4.  
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This is in recognition that in a democratic society, engaging and eliminating corruption is also 
a process of conscience in terms of honouring basic stakeholders’ rights at the individual 
managerial level. Democratic societies cannot function on legal processes alone; in order to 
thrive they need commitments from individuals who are part of society. The adoption of a 
‘stakeholder compliance approach’ by multinational business managers is a better practice in 
dealing with corruption/bribery, and a tribute to democracy and the value creation role of 
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